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The Power Four conferences are attempting to stop NFL players and other professionals from becoming college athletes again, but they’ll likely need to convince federal and state courts that banning former (and perhaps future) pros is lawful under antitrust law. The Big Ten on Tuesday announced it was prohibiting players who signed with pro football teams or participated in a pro football draft without withdrawing. The SEC announced schools could not roster anyone who had declared for the NFL, NBA or WNBA drafts and not withdrawn; anyone who had signed a contract with a professional football team, NBA/G-League team or WNBA team; or anyone listed on a roster for those leagues. Media reports indicate that the Big 12 has approved and the ACC will likely approve similar new eligibility rules distinct from existing NCAA eligibility rules that deem ineligible players who declare for the NFL Draft and don’t withdraw, or who take further steps, such as signing a contract with an NFL team. Such rulemaking would conflict with the return of players like tight end Dae’Quan Wright, whom the Cleveland Browns waived this week so that he could sign with LSU following a ruling by a Louisiana judge permitting Wright and other players to return. The SEC’s rule also applies to basketball players who sign with NBA teams, such as new LSU player RJ Luis Jr.; he was previously under contract with the Utah Jazz and Boston Celtics and played in the NBA preseason. The eligibility of players who are seasoned college athletes, some of whom turn pro and then want to come back, has become a major legal controversy in the sports industry and obscured the line between college and professional. Last Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit stayed a nationwide injunction that had allowed former NCAA players who began college play in 2022–23, completed four years of eligibility, graduated and signed with professional teams to play another college season. Although the nationwide injunction is no longer in effect, players can seek injunctions in state courts, and some will likely obtain them. In the eligibility litigation against the NCAA, players and their attorneys have raised three main legal theories. The first is that the NCAA has monopsony power over the purchase of college athletes’ labor and marketing services, and that it has allegedly abused that power to suppress compensation for those athletes. Monopsony power is like monopoly power, except that it involves a buyer abusing its control. Monopsony issues have come up with the PGA Tour, UFC and other sports associations where athletes are recruited. The second is that colleges and conferences are competing businesses that conspire through NCAA rules to limit how each can compete for college athletes’ services. Acting on their own, schools might offer players much more money than allowed by NCAA rules or permitted by the House settlement, which authorizes colleges to directly pay athletes a share of up to 22% of the average Power Four conference’s athletic media, ticket and sponsorship revenue. For some college athletes, playing another season can mean millions of dollars through revenue shares and NIL contracts, plus the not-insignificant monetary value of athletic scholarships, which cover costs such as tuition, housing and health resources. Returning athletes, who are often 22 or 23 years old, can also further develop their games to better position themselves for playing in the pros. These athletes argue that schools want to sign them, and that rules preventing those signings amount to group boycotts and price-fixing schemes that deny players considerable earnings—earnings that might eclipse whatever they could earn in a “real job” out of college. The third line of legal attack is an alleged misapplication of an eligibility rule, typically involving a waiver application denied by the NCAA. That approach worked for attorney Tom Mars in his case on behalf of Ole Miss quarterback Trinidad Chambliss, whom Mississippi courts determined should not have had his 2022 season count toward his eligibility because of health problems. Back to individual conferences deciding on their own eligibility rules—this is not a new phenomenon. Earlier this year, the Big 12 argued that, even though Texas Tech quarterback Brendan Sorsby received an injunction from a Texas judge allowing him to play despite the NCAA deeming him ineligible because of gambling issues, the conference sued Texas Tech and insisted that its own conference rules barred Sorsby. He left Texas Tech and college football and aims to join an NFL team in 2027. The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that conferences, at least when acting on their own, have substantial discretion to set rules. That point was made clear by Justice Neil Gorsuch in NCAA v. Alston (2021). The NCAA lost that case, with the Court holding that NCAA member schools’ agreement not to pay athletes for academic-related expenses constituted illegal price fixing under antitrust law. But Gorsuch also wrote that an individual conference, through its members’ voting, can adopt various rules restraining athletes’ potential compensation as conference members see fit. Specifically, Gorsuch asserted that Alston “applies only to the NCAA and multiconference agreements” and that “individual conferences remain free to reimpose every single enjoined restraint tomorrow—or more restrictive ones still.” Gorsuch’s logic was put to the test in Choh & Kirk v. Brown University et al., which was brought by two former Brown basketball players who argued that the Ivy League and its eight schools—Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Penn, Princeton and Yale—violated antitrust law through the conference’s policy of not offering athletic scholarships. (For transparency, I am a visiting professor of law at Harvard Law School but was not involved in the litigation.) Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Choh. The Second Circuit noted that athletes could attend similarly prestigious but non-Ivy schools, such as Stanford, Georgetown or Duke, that offer athletic scholarships if they insist on receiving one. The Second Circuit also stressed Gorsuch’s reasoning in Alston. It “makes sense” that individual conferences can adopt their own rules, the Second Circuit reasoned, since “no individual conference . . . enjoys” the “level of market dominance” enjoyed by the NCAA. One problem with multiple power conferences deciding around the same time to alter their own eligibility rules is that their actions might seem coordinated. If they’re coordinating on eligibility, the conferences might unwittingly forfeit the individual-conference defense Gorsuch articulated in Alston. Granted, conferences could argue the timing of their discussions and leaks to media doesn’t reveal coordination but rather the reality of the fall season and fall semester each conference faces. The season is starting soon, and courtesy of court orders, former college athletes plan to return. These returning athletes could take roster spots or at least playing time away from freshmen and transfers. There’s also the reality of add/drop and other university registration rules for enrolling in fall semester courses, as athletes need to remain full-time students in good standing. It’s possible these issues will play out in court if conferences deny roster spots to returning athletes. The athletes would argue they’re empowered to return by court orders against the NCAA. They could seek injunctions against conferences and raise the antitrust arguments articulated above, including that individual schools (and their coaches) within a conference want to sign them. In response, conferences would insist they can decide eligibility for students who play sports at member schools, especially when the eligibility of returning players might harm current players. If “only” the Big Ten excluded returning players, a court would be more inclined to rule for the Big Ten because those players could go to a different Power Four conference. But if all four conferences exclude the players, there might not be a suitable alternative. And that’s a possible antitrust problem. Molly Geary contributed to this story. (This story has been updated throughout after the Big Ten and SEC announced their rule changes.)